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Book Review
JOHN A. ADAMS, JR., MEXICAN BANKING AND INVESTMENT IN TRANSITION

(Westport, CT: Quorum Books, 1997) 238 pp.

Michael P. Malloy*

Recent developments in Mexican banking regulation and structure are of
continuing interest to scholars and transnational practitioners alike Aside from the
simple fact of geographic contiguity between U.S. and Mexican markets, this interest
is probably due in large part to three significant events: the conclusion of the North
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA)2 in 1993, the Mexican fiscal crisis that
emerged in 1994, 3 and the conclusion of the General Agreement on Trade in Services
(GATS), 4 under the auspices of the World Trade Organization, in 1994. Mexico has
been intimately involved in these events, and they have had a substantial impact on
the restructuring of Mexican banking and bank regulation.

*
Professor of Law, McGeorge School of Law, University of the Pacific.
1. See, e.g., Ricardo J. Cata, Inter-American Law, 31 INT'L LAW. 527 (1997) (discussing legal implications
of Mexican peso devaluation in December 1994, among other developments); Nora Lustig, Mexico in Crisis,The
U.S. to the Rescue: The FinancialAssistance Packages of 1982 and 1995,2 UCLA J. INT'L L. & FOREIGN AFF. 25
(1997) (analyzing recent financial assistance package); Alejandro Nadal, The Mexican Economic Recovery, 23
CAN.-U.S. L.J. 59 (1997) (providing brief review of economic recovery measures); Juan Francisco Torres-Landa,
John E. Rogers & Carlos R. Valencia Barrera, Mexican Law, 31 INT'L Law. 535 (1997) (discussing, inter alia,
recent measures to strengthen Mexican financial system).
2.
NAFTA, Dec. 17, 1993,32 IN'LLEG. MAThRIALS 605 (1993). On the legal implications of the NAFIA,
see, e.g., John P. Fitzpatrick, The Future of the North American Free TradeAgreement: A ComparativeAnalysis
of the Role of Regional Economic Institutions and the Harmonization of Law in North America and Western
Europe, 19 Hous. J. INT'L L. 1 (1996); Frank J. Garcia, NAFTA and the Creationof the FTAA: A Critique of
PiecemealAccession, 35 VA.J. INT'L L. 539 (1995); David Lopez, DisputeResolution underNAFTA: Lessonsfrom
the Early Experience, 32 TEX. INT'L L. J. 163 (1997); Sergio Lopez Ayllon, The Impact of InternationalTrade
Agreements in the Legal Systems of the American Continent, 19 Hous. J. INT'L L. 761 (1997); Stephen Zamora,
Allocating Legislative Competence in the Americas: The Early Experience under NAFTA and the Challenge of
Hemispheric Integration, 19 Hous. J. INT'L L. 615 (1997); Stephen Zamora, NAFTA and the Harmonizationof
Domestic Legal Systems: The Side Effects of Free Trade, 12 ARIZ. J. INT'L & CoMP. L. 401 (1997).
3.
See Lustig, supranote I (discussing legal implications of fiscal crisis).
4.
General Agreement on Trade in Services; 15 April 1994, Agreement Establishing the World Trade
Organization, Annex 1B, 33 Int'l Leg. Materials 1167 (1994) [hereinafter GATS]. WTO members are not permitted
to derogate from adherence to Annex lB. Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, art. XVI, 5. For
an excellent review of the GATS and its implications for banking, see Kristin Leigh Case, Recent Development,
The Daiwa Wake.Up Call: The Needfor InternationalStandardsfor BankingSupervision, 26 GA. J. INT'L & COMP.
L. 215 (1996). See generally JOHN H. JACKSON, WILLIAM J. DAVEY & ALAN 0. SYKES, LEGAL PROBLEMS OF
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS 893-931 (West Publishing Co., 3d ed. 1995) (offering general discussion
of GATS).
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Banks, particularly U.S. banks, have had a long and not altogether pleasant
interaction with Mexico.5 From independence in 1821 until the 1870s, the Mexican
financial system was incapable of aiding development. Finally, in 1884 the Frenchowned Banco Nacional Mexicano was authorized by Mexico to act as its central
bank, but there was no centralized control of bank note issuance, and this continued
to hamper development.
Pursuant to the mandate of the 1917 Constitution, Banco de Mexico was
organized in 1925, with exclusive power to issue notes. Unfortunately, Mexico was
dogged by a succession of bank failures, inflation, and currency devaluations through
the end of the 1930s. In 1934, the Nacional Financiera was established to promote
the development of a domestic capital market, among other things by administering
large public trust funds for development purposes, and by issuing guarantees for
domestic and foreign indebtedness of a number of public and private enterprises. In
1937 Mexico established Banco Nacional de Commercio Exterior to promote foreign
trade by granting loans to finance exports and imports, production of exports and
imports and to issue guarantees and letters of credit with respect to foreign trade.
Mexico has been traditionally wary of the intervention of foreign banks in the
national market. Until recently, foreign banks were only permitted to establish representative offices in Mexico, and only since 1979 have they been allowed to
incorporate offshore financial operations. With the exception of Citibank's grandfathered operations, foreign banks were not permitted to engage in retail branch
operations. To make matters worse, following the 1982 fiscal crisis and Mexico's
repudiation of its external debt, almost all banks in Mexico were nationalized in
September 1982.6
Mr. Adams' book takes up the story of Mexico's path towards fiscal redemption
and the role that the reform of Mexican bank structure and regulation is playing in
this policy initiative. He tells the story well, in a practical and informed manner, with
a large helping of very useful economic and market data. It should be noted,
however, that this book is not a work of legal analysis, and it will not directly assist
the reader in understanding the legal foundations of Mexican bank reform.
The book takes essentially a chronological approach. It begins with the unsettled
and unsettling state of Mexican policy with respect to banking and investment in the
1970s and 1980s, 7 and the role of banking and external debt in Mexico's
developmental problems and emerging fiscal crisis.8 It then examines the crucial
historical role of regional trade and finance in Mexican economic and development

5.
See, e.g., Wendt, The Role of Foreign Banks in InternationalBanking, in W. H. BAUGHN & D. R.
MANDI C, THE INTRNATIONAL BANKING HANDBOOK 47, 61-62 (1983) (discussing Mexican banking and bank
regulation).
6.
See, e.g., Callejo v. Bancomer, S.A., 764 F.2d 1101 (5th Cir. 1985) (involving legal dispute in aftermath
of Mexican bank nationalization).
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7.

JoHN A. ADAMS, JR., MEXICAN BANKING AND INvEsTNTiNTRANsION 1-12 (1997).

8.

Id. at 13-31.
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policy.9 In light of this history, it is natural that contemporary efforts by Mexico to
reform its economy have been both spurred by and focused upon the enhancement
of regional trade and cooperation, 1° with a growing role for transparent, direct foreign
investment."i
In the midst of this developmental saga, the currency crisis of 1994 looms
large.12 Nevertheless, the book concludes with a strong optimism for the future of
reform of Mexican banking policy and structure. i3 It argues that "the economic
1990's, [and]
fundamentals [remained] relatively sound during much of the 'early
4
pace.'
surprising
a
at
recoup
gradually
to
able
Mexico has been
This book is a helpful survey of contemporary developments that should be of
interest to practitioners and scholars. There are some drawbacks, however. The
writing is sometimes less than felicitous.' s There is a lack of precision in some of the
discussion.' 6
While the book's coverage of the impact of NAFTA on the reform of Mexican
banking policy and structure is always useful and pertinent, the book would have
benefited from more extensive discussion of the future implications of GATS 7 on
the reform process. The GATS establishes "a multilateral framework of principles
and rules for trade in services with a view to the expansion of such trade under
conditions of transparency and progressive liberalization,"' 8 by applying GATT
nondiscrimination principles to trade in services.' 9
The interplay of GATS obligations and national and regional banking policy is
of interest, since the GATS specifically applies to financial services,' but permits
WTO member states to enforce domestic regulations for "prudential reasons,
including for the protection of... depositors.... or persons to whom a fiduciary
duty is owed by a financial service supplier, or to ensure the integrity and stability
9.

Id. at 33-50.

10. Id.at5l-66.
11. Id. at 67-86.
12. See id. at 87-134 (discussing peso devaluation of 1994 and resulting 1995 failure of confidence). See
also id. at 135-152 (discussing "Tequila hangover' effect on other regional economies).
13. Id. at 153-76.
14. Id. at 153.
15. My two favorite passages in this regard are the previously quoted remark by Adams about Mexico
"graduallyrecoup[ing] at a surprisingpace" (emphasis added; see supra,text at note 14), and this magnificently
impenetrable sentence:
One of the principal trade negotiating objectives of the United States called for equal market access for
"all services," and also agreed to by Mexico to include financial services such as banking, securities,
insurance and financial intermediaries.
ADAMS, supranote 7, at 61.
16. For example, Adams misidentifies the OATS, an annex to the Agreement establishing the WTO, as a
"portion of NAFrA:' Id. at 61. Cf. supra,note 4 (discussing GATS).
17. Supra note 4.

18. GATS, preamble.
19. See, e.g., GATS, art. H,I I (applying most-favored-nation treatment to services and service suppliers);
OATS, art. XVII, I (applying national treatment to services and service suppliers of other WTO member states).
20. GATS, Annex on Financial Services.
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of the financial system."2 t How this might work out for a banking system in transition, like Mexico's, would be a useful extension of the book's analysis.
In addition, aside from a glancing reference, 2 the book does not discuss the
implications for continuing regional cooperation of the enactment of the Cuban
Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act of 1996 ("Helms-Burton").3 Helms-Burton
has been a source of significant controversy between the United States and its trading
partners, including Mexico.? Title I of the act, which has been temporarily
suspended by presidential determination, authorizes a private cause of action for a
U.S. national against any third party holding property that had been confiscated by
the Cuban Government from the U.S. national.' Despite the abeyance of Title III,
some foreign firms, including Cemex, the Mexican cement producer, have divested
themselves of Cuban assets. 26 However, Mexico joined Canada in a NAFTA against
Helms-Burton. 27 In addition, in October 1996, Mexico enacted "antidote" legislation
that authorizes counterstrike causes of action for Mexican nationals to recover
damages assessed against them in Title I litigation, and prohibits Mexican firms
from furnishing information to foreign authorities concerning involvement in Cuban
assets.28
Title IV of Helms-Burton, which is currently in effect, authorizes denial of entry
into the United States to any firm, or any official or employee of a firm, that
"trafficks" in expropriated Cuban property formerly owned by a U.S. national. 29This
provision is already having an impact on regional trade relations, 0 and will undoubtedly continue to affect regional economic cooperation.
It would have been interesting to have Adams' thoughts and observations on this
problem. Nevertheless, on the core concerns of his book, Adams makes a useful
contribution to the literature.

21. GATS, Annex on Financial Services, § 2(a).
22. See ADAMS, supra note 7, at 159 ("indirect irritation in Mexico over the Helms-Burton Act restricting
trade with Cuba... could have contributed to the hard line of the Mexican government" concerning maquila
facilities).
23. Pub. L. No. 104-114, Mar. 12, 1996, 109 Stat. 826 (1996) (codified at scattered sections of 22 U.S.C.).
24. See, e.g., Ralph Galliano, Cubaa Dilemmafor Clinton:Anger Floridaor U.S. Allies, J. CoMM. July 15,
1996, at 7B.
25. Id.
26. Carla Anne Robbins & Jose de Cordoba, Clinton Puts Cuba Lawsuits on Hold, WALL ST. J., July 17,
1996, at A10.
27. Julia Preston, Clinton Envoy FindsMexico Adamant on Cuba, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 29, 1996, at AS.
28. Law for the Protection of Commerce and Investment from Foreign Laws Which Violate International
Law, DIARiO OFICIAL DE LAW FEDERACION, Oct. 22, 1996. See John Maggs, U.S. Warns EU: Cuba Showdown
CouldHurt WTO, J. COMM., Oct. 3, 1996, at 3A (discussing then proposed Mexican legislation).
29. See Jose de Cordoba, Mexico's Domes Catches U.S.-Cuba Heat, WALL ST. J., Aug. 19, 1996, at A9
(discussing effect of Title IV on Mexican firm).
30. See id.

